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 1 
CONSTRAINTS TO THE MANAGEMENT OF RANGELAND AS A 
COMMON PROPERTY IN CENTRAL EASTERN CAPE PROVINCE, 
SOUTH AFRICA. 
 
JE Bennett1
Extensive livestock production from natural rangeland areas remains an important 
aspect of agricultural production and rural livelihoods in many parts of the world (Niamir-
Fuller and Turner 1999, Turner and Hiernaux 2002).  The key feature connecting many 
of these systems is that rangeland used for grazing is held and administered as a 
common property, or common pool, resource.  Both Berkes et al. (1989) and Ostrom et 
al. (1999) consider common property resources as those that share two important 
characteristics.  The first is that exclusion (or control of access) of users to these 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper takes as its starting point the assertion that current rangeland management 
in the central Eastern Cape Province (former Ciskei) of South Africa, is characterised 
primarily by an ‘open-access’ approach.  Empirical material drawn from three case-
study communities in the region is used to examine the main barriers to management of 
rangeland as a ‘commons’.  The general inability to define and enforce rights to 
particular grazing resources in the face of competing claims from ‘outsiders’, as well as 
inadequate local institutions responsible for rangeland management are highlighted as 
being of key importance.  These are often exacerbated by lack of available grazing land, 
diffuse user groups and local political and ethnic divisions.  Many of these problems 
have a strong legacy in historical apartheid policies such as forced resettlement and 
betterment planning.  
 
On this basis it is argued that policy should focus on facilitating the emergence of 
effective, local institutions for rangeland management.  Given the limited grazing 
available to many communities in the region, a critical aspect of this will be finding ways 
to legitimise current patterns of extensive resource use, which traverse existing 
‘community’ boundaries.  However, this runs counter to recent legislation, which 
strongly links community management with legal ownership of land within strictly 
defined boundaries.  Finding ways to overcome this apparent disjuncture between 
policy and practice will be vital for the effective management of common pool grazing 
resources in the region.      
 
KEY WORDS: Communal land, institutions, grazing management. 
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resources is difficult.  The second is that each user is capable of subtracting from the 
welfare of others. 
 
Inherent in this definition is the potential for the over-exploitation of common property 
resources as epitomised by the ‘tragedy of the commons’ scenario famously articulated 
by Hardin (1968).  However, subsequent empirical and theoretical research suggests 
that this negative outcome constitutes just one of several alternative scenarios and that 
in many parts of the world effective governance systems are in place, which allow 
common property resources to be utilised on a sustainable basis (e.g. Berkes 1989, 
Ostrom et al. 1999).  Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop (1975) were amongst the first to 
explicitly recognise the major failing of Hardin’s paradigm in its confusion of common 
property with ‘open access’.  Since this time, there has been considerable development 
of the so-called ‘new institutionalist’ paradigm, which recognises that the commons can 
be managed sustainably on a communal basis and formally defines the social 
environment necessary to facilitate this (Berkes et al. 1989, Ostrom 1990).    
 
The parameters that distinguish common property from open-access regimes have 
been concisely outlined by Bromley (1989) and Ostrom (1990).  According to Bromley 
(1989: 871), a common property regime (CPR) consists of  
“…a well-defined group of authorised users, a well-defined resource that the group will 
manage and use, and a set of institutional arrangements that define each of the above, 
as well as the rules of use for the resource in question.”  
Conversely, in open access situations users have privilege with respect to the use of the 
resource as nobody has the legal right to exclude them.  However, they have no actual 
rights to the resource (Bromley 1989).   
 
This interpretation of common property has itself been subject to considerable critique.  
Cousins (2000) has argued that an emphasis on defined resource boundaries is 
unsuited to many African grazing systems, where boundaries tend to be inherently 
‘fuzzy’ to accommodate extensive, opportunistic herd movement.  Furthermore, the 
centrality of rules for resource use in the new institutionalist approach has also been 
questioned.  In Africa, institutions and rules are often informal and flexible and access to 
resources is often secured through complex social networks and negotiation (Cousins 
2000).  Thus, the semantics of common property remain contested.  Nevertheless, the 
general division between common property and open access regimes continues to be 
recognised and has important implications for the management of communal grazing 
resources and their preservation in the longer term.   
 
In South Africa, common pool grazing resources have been subject to considerable 
state interference in the way they are held and managed (De Wet 1987, Yawitch 1988).  
This has also occurred in other parts of the world (Woodhouse et al. 2000, Peters 
2004), but what is almost unique in the South African context is the sheer scale and 
time period over which this has taken place.  The historical legacy of minority rule has 
given rise to a situation in which communal rangelands are almost exclusively confined 
to the former homeland regions of the country.  These areas, designated under colonial 
rule and formalised under apartheid, constitute just 13% of the total land in South Africa 
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and were created as reserves in which the bulk of the black population was forced to 
reside (Yawitch 1988).  Some 12.7 million people (about 30% of the national total) still 
live in these areas (Statistics South Africa 2001).   
 
The central Eastern Cape region, which constitutes the focus of this study, includes the 
former homeland of Ciskei.  Here a particularly complex history of state-controlled land 
use planning has had a strong influence on the way in which rangeland is now 
accessed and managed by the indigenous Xhosa people.  This began in the middle of 
the nineteenth century, when the colonial authorities started to deprive the Xhosa of 
their extensive, traditional grazing lands and to settle them on a permanent basis in 
newly created ‘black reserve’ areas (Hebinck and Van Averbeke, 2007).  Individuals 
were allocated residential and arable land under title with access rights to a surrounding 
defined commonage area for grazing.  This represented a fundamental shift in 
agricultural production from a system based on seasonal transhumance and shifting 
cultivation, to one that was effectively agro-pastoral in nature with crop production 
occurring on private plots and grazing on communal rangeland within fixed boundaries.  
The loss of pastoral mobility, combined with continuous cultivation of single plots, 
increased pressure on local resources.  By the early part of the twentieth century this 
had resulted in extensive land degradation in some areas and a number of conservation 
and land management programmes were instigated by the government, in response 
(Beinart 2003).  Probably the most important of these was ‘betterment planning’ first 
introduced during the 1930s (Beinart 2003).  Its imposition was particularly thorough in 
the former Ciskei, with about 79% of areas subject to some degree of planning by the 
early 1970s (Trollope and Coetzee 1975).   
 
The betterment process was concerned primarily with improving land use and its most 
tangible manifestation was the introduction of extensive contouring on arable land 
allocations and the reinforcement of existing divisions into rangeland, arable land and 
residential land through the use of fencing (De Wet 1987).  Concomitant with these 
physical alterations was the introduction of a system of improved land management, 
which was frequently enforced by the state.  This was primarily oriented towards 
agriculture and included the active management of rangeland for livestock production.   
An important feature of this was the rotational grazing of fenced range camps.  This 
generally took the form of the one-herd-four-camp system, whereby one grazing camp 
was rested for the entire year and the remaining three were grazed on a rotational basis 
(Trollope and Coetzee 1975, Forbes and Trollope 1991).  This system was perpetuated 
under state control in the Ciskei until the 1970s, when the South African Bantu Trust, 
responsible for its enforcement, was dissolved and control effectively devolved to 
individual communities (Forbes and Trollope 1991).  
 
Another example of government-imposed social engineering, which was of importance 
in shaping population pressure and land access within in the region, was the 
resettlement of Africans forcibly removed from so-called ‘black spots’ during the 
apartheid era.  These ‘forced removals’ began during the late 1950s in an attempt to 
realise the separate development goals of apartheid.  There was a considerable amount 
of resettlement in the former Ciskei, although the redistribution of individuals was far 
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from uniform (Surplus People Project 1983).  An important driver of this resettlement 
was the consolidation of the Ciskei homeland during the 1970s and early 1980s 
(Wotshela 2001).  This consolidation process was an attempt by the apartheid 
government to create an autonomous, and geographically continuous, Ciskei homeland 
by redrawing its original boundaries and relocating any black people that lay outside 
them.  The process involved the loss of several outlying and non-contiguous former 
districts of the Ciskei and their replacement with a number of so-called ‘released areas’, 
which consisted primarily of white commercial farms bought up by the South African 
government and allocated to the new Ciskei (Wotshela 2001).  The impact of this land 
reallocation was enormous, with some 50,000 refugees choosing to leave the ceded 
districts and be resettled in the newly acquired released areas in the north of Ciskei 
(Surplus People Project 1983).  As a result these areas became some of the most 
overcrowded and poorly resourced within the Ciskei.  Lack of available sites meant that 
many families were never allocated land and simply became squatters on existing land 
or occupied neighbouring farms (Wotshela 2001).   
 
Despite concerted research efforts in a number of different parts of South Africa (e.g. 
Ainslie 1999, Cocks et al. 2001, Peden 2005, Allsopp et al. 2007), we are only 
beginning to understand the effect this legacy of systematic state planning has had on 
the way common property grazing resources are now held and managed in communal 
areas.  Nevertheless, the South African government has enacted legislation, such as 
the Communal Property Associations (CPA) Act (1996) and, more recently, the 
Communal Land Rights Act (CLRA) (2004), which seeks to acknowledge and give legal 
status to the ownership and management of land on a communal basis.  Underpinning 
this is the idea that effective CPRs are already in place in communal areas or will 
spontaneously emerge in response to secure land rights.  This concept has been 
strongly challenged by several commentators who hold that many of the key 
foundations for successful common property management are simply not fulfilled in the 
Eastern Cape region at present (Ainslie 1998, Cocks et al. 2001, Bennett and Barrett 
2007).  Specifically, the erosion of traditional institutions involved in land administration, 
extensive social stratification, ethnic divisions and excessive problems of landlessness 
and overcrowding in these former homeland areas have been highlighted as potential 
barriers to the functioning of effective, egalitarian systems of common property 
management (Ainslie 1999).   
 
Thus, there is much about the current functioning of property regimes in communal 
areas that remains poorly understood.  Addressing this knowledge gap is imperative if 
common property institutions are to be effectively tailored to the contemporary 
conditions of extensive livestock production in South Africa.  Building specifically on the 
work of Ainslie (1999) and Bennett and Barrett (2007) in the region, this paper aims to 
characterise the grazing management regimes currently in operation in communal areas 
of central Eastern Cape Province.  It uses three case study villages to explore the 
current and historical property regimes associated with communal grazing systems in 
the region and interprets this in the context of socio-political and natural resource 
constraints.  On this basis, a typology of current grazing management systems is 
developed for the region.  It concludes by examining the general implications of the 
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findings for the restructuring of institutions associated with common property resources 
as a whole in South Africa.   
 
 
METHOD 
 
The Study Sites 
The three sites used for the study were Allanwater in Lukhanji Local Municipality and 
Lushington and Roxeni in Nkonkoe Local Municipality (Figure 1).  They were selected to 
represent the considerable socio-political and ecological heterogeneity in the region.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Location of study sites within central Eastern Cape Province. 
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Data collection 
Primary data collection was undertaken at all three communities during July 2006 and 
involved a combination of RRA and traditional interview approaches, to facilitate 
triangulation.  This began at each village with an overview of the different resources 
available through a participatory mapping exercise, which involved as many of villagers 
as possible and was complemented by the construction of a timeline of important events 
in village development (Mikkelsen 1995).  Subsequently, an informal semi-structured 
group interview was undertaken with about 10-15 individuals at each village to provide 
greater detail about rangeland access and grazing management (Mikkelsen 1995, 
Robson 2002).  These individuals were generally key livestock owners, mainly older 
males.  At Roxeni, this was augmented by individual, semi-structured interviews with 
key informants, including the chairman of the local farmer’s association (Robson 2002).  
Interviewees were purposively selected from the group work, to provide greater depth 
based on their personal experience and different perceptions of changes in resource 
use.  Finally, walks were undertaken around each settlement with purposively selected 
key informants, to help corroborate the information from the previous work and facilitate 
elimination of inconsistencies (Mikkelsen 1995).   
 
This empirical work was complemented by concomitant secondary data collection, 
which provided the background to the sites in terms of the basic social and agro-
ecological data that was available.  In some cases this also helped with the triangulation 
of primary data.   
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Findings from the three villages are grouped under key headings, beginning with a 
background overview of the settlements followed by an outline of the grazing resources 
and their management in more detail.   
 
Socio-historical and geographical overview 
Although the three research villages lie within in relatively close proximity to one another 
(Figure 1), they differ markedly with respect to many of the social and ecological factors 
that characterise this highly heterogeneous area. 
 
Historically, Roxeni is distinct from the other two villages in that it has a relatively long 
history of settlement.  Together with the neighbouring villages of Gaga and Ely it formed 
part of the Gaga Tribal Authority, which was planned by colonial surveyors during the 
1860s, with land allocation under quitrent tenure2
                                                 
2 Quitrent is a form of land title allocated to Africans under colonial rule, which provided secure tenure on 
provision of annual rental fee. 
.  As part of this, land was formally 
subdivided into an area of common grazing and an arable land allocation, where the 
villagers had their fields.  The current extent of each of these is 978 ha and 125 ha, 
respectively giving a total area of 1103 ha for the village (DALA 1997).  In contrast, 
Allanwater and Lushington are relatively recent ‘villages’ established on released areas 
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during the political and geographical reordering of the Ciskei during the 1970s.  Both are 
composed of a number of formerly white-owned, commercial livestock farms although 
they differ considerably in their spatial arrangement.   
 
Allanwater consists of a single settlement, the origins of which can be traced to the 
illegal occupation of the released farm ‘Allanwater’ in 1976 by a small group of refugee 
families who had arrived from the ceded Glen Grey district of the former Ciskei 
(Wotshela 2001).  Although this area was not designated for occupation a settlement 
was established (‘Diphala’) and in 1986, this was formalised when the local Department 
of Agriculture intervened and allocated 120 residential sites under communal tenure.  
However, no formal tenure was granted over arable plots, nor was there any official 
demarcation of grazing land (Wotshela 2001).  Since this time the village has expanded 
considerably and although it is still referred to as “Allanwater” it now includes portions of 
several other adjacent former farms, amounting to some 5,000 ha in total extent (M. 
Goqwana pers. comm.).   
 
In contrast, the village of Lushington consists of four distinct settlements; Elundini, 
Elukhanyweni, Khayelitsha and Ekuphumleni.  These are distributed over an extensive 
area, and have complex and very different histories of growth and development.   
Elukhanyweni (‘Eluk') and Khayelitsha are located close together and were the first to 
be established during the late 1970s, as small settlements of former farm workers.  
These were subsequently expanded through the migration of people from the 
overcrowded and degraded Glen Grey and Herschel areas of the former Transkei.  This 
migration actively continues, mainly involving relatives of existing residents.  Elundini is 
the most geographically isolated settlement, situated some 2 km from Eluk and 
Khayelitsha.  Its origins are somewhat different, with most inhabitants having been 
forcibly removed from the nearby Tyume Valley area in 1983, to facilitate the building of 
a large dam.  During the mid-1980s, these three settlements were formally surveyed by 
the Department of Agriculture, which approved the allocation of residential and arable 
land, although without formal title.  Ekuphumleni is a much more recent settlement 
founded by individuals looking to break away from the other settlements.  Importantly, it 
has been established without formal land allocation, in an area designated as good 
quality arable land.  This has caused resentment amongst other villagers, many of 
whom consider it a squatter settlement.   
 
The three villages also differ in terms of key development indicators.  Whereas Roxeni 
is relatively wealthy (mean annual household income of R 18,842), Lushington (mean 
annual household income of R 5,369) and Allanwater (mean annual household income 
of just R 3,473 and >50% of households with no cash income at all) are relatively poor 
in cash income terms.  The same disparity is also evident in educational attainment, 
with over 97% of inhabitants at Roxeni of 20 years of age or greater having received at 
least a basic primary education, whereas 17% of those of equivalent age at Lushington 
and 26% at Allanwater had received no formal schooling whatsoever (Statistics South 
Africa 2001).  These data help to corroborate the social and geographical identity of 
these villages. Roxeni is effectively a commuter settlement benefiting from close 
proximity to a main highway and nearby towns, whereas Lushington and Allanwater are 
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relatively isolated, rural settlements where people depend more on the community and 
their local resources for a livelihood.  Allanwater’s largely pastoral identity is underlined 
by the fact that almost all households own livestock and most are active in marketing 
their animals, which enables 16% of households to make a livelihood out full-time 
farming (King 2002).  Furthermore, livestock holdings at Allanwater are considerable 
with 1,006 cattle, 1,560 sheep and 1,263 goats recorded during 2002 (ECDA 2002).  
This gives a mean holding of 16 cattle, 55 sheep and 18 goats per household, which is 
very high for the region (Ainslie 2002, Van Averbeke and Bennett 2007).  In 
comparison, overall holdings at Roxeni amounted to 361 cattle, 274 sheep and 783 
goats in 2006 (S. Mlumbi pers. comm.), which represented a marked decline from the 
452 cattle, 438 sheep and 1,122 goats held at the village in 1997 (DALA 1997). 
 
The regional heterogeneity of the natural environment is also represented in the three 
villages.  Roxeni, Lushington and Allanwater are situated at mean elevations above sea 
level of around 600, 900 and 1500 m, respectively.  However, this increase in elevation 
does not produce an increase in mean annual rainfall (MAR) as might be expected, 
since there is a general trend of decreasing rainfall with distance from the coast (Marais, 
1975).  Indeed, Roxeni has the highest MAR of 616 mm, with a co-efficient of variation 
(CV) of 0.22, although the local veld (rangeland) classification is False Thornveld of the 
Eastern Cape, a form generally representative of areas of lower rainfall.  MAR at 
Lushington is estimated through extrapolation at 600 mm (CV 0.24) and the local veld 
type is karroid shrub with Dohne and Highland Sourveld at higher elevations.  At 
Allanwater long term (1955-2004) rainfall data are available from nearby Waterdown 
Dam, which suggests a MAR of 472 mm (CV 0.32).  The local rangeland is composed 
of two main veld types, Dry Cymbopogon-Themeda veld and Karroid Merxmullera 
Mountain Veld (King 2002).  The relatively low CVs of rainfall at all three sites underline 
the fact that the grazing ecology of the region is predominantly equilibrial in character 
making much of it amenable to semi-intensive management through techniques such as 
rotational grazing and resting (Scogings et al. 1999).   
 
 
Grazing management 
Grazing at all sites mostly involves the use of formally designated rangeland (veld) 
areas but also makes use of the arable land allocations, which are opened to grazing 
during the dry season as an additional forage reserve.     
 
Management of rangeland grazing 
Given that it has existed as a planned settlement for over a century longer than the 
other two villages, Roxeni has an unsurprisingly more complex history of engagement 
with rangeland management.  Nevertheless, for a long period after its initial planning, 
grazing management at Roxeni appears to have followed a fairly consistent pattern.  
According to some of the older men at the village, the original range area was extensive 
and divided into nine discrete sections (‘camps’ as the villagers referred to them) by 
natural features such as small watercourses and erosion channels.  A system of 
rotational resting was practised (urawulane), whereby one section was rested for a 
period of one year and the remaining eight were grazed simultaneously.  Each year the 
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rested section changed.  The decision concerning resting was made by the headman of 
the village during a meeting involving the local men.  It was then the responsibility of 
individual livestock owners to ensure that their stock did not graze in the rested area 
and also to ensure that livestock from neighbouring villages did not encroach on 
Roxeni’s grazing land.  Contravention of the grazing rules resulted in animals being 
impounded and owners fined to facilitate their release. 
 
The arrival of betterment planning in the area resulted in several changes in land use.  
Early betterment efforts at Roxeni were fiercely contested, as there was an initial 
proposal to move the entire community to establish a white-owned commercial fruit 
operation.  As a consequence, by the time betterment was implemented in 1965, much 
of the available grazing had been reallocated to the neighbouring villages of Gaga and 
Kwezana.  What remained was fenced into four camps surrounded by a perimeter 
fence, in line with grazing management policy at the time.  The management system 
also changed significantly.  Rotational resting was retained on one of the camps for a 
period of one year but grazing of the three active camps was now undertaken on a 
rotational basis.  Decisions concerning both of these factors were made centrally by a 
newly formed ‘Bantu Trust’ located in nearby King Williams Town and administered by 
the village headman and an appointed grazing committee.  At a practical level 
enforcement was undertaken by a local ranger who was selected from the village and 
paid by the government.  Fines for non-compliance continued as previously.    
 
Centralised control over grazing management disappeared during the 1970s with the 
demise of the Bantu Trust.  However, a system of internal management using the 
betterment fences persisted until the overthrow of the Ciskei government of Lennox 
Sebe in 1990.  Immediately after this the headman system disintegrated and in this 
institutional vacuum rotational resting and grazing practices were abandoned and the 
camp and perimeter fencing began to be removed.  With the fencing now almost 
completely gone, livestock from Roxeni and the surrounding villages currently free-
range over a considerable area of common grazing land, with little or no centralised 
control on their movement.  However, institutions associated with land use have re-
emerged.  Undoubtedly the most important of these is Roxeni Farmer’s Association 
(RFA), created in 1997 as a Common Property Association (CPA), with legal status.  
This is open to all members of the community upon payment of an annual membership 
fee, has an elected committee (including a Chairman), and appears to be responsible 
for all aspects of arable and livestock management.  However, in the absence of fencing 
to provide strong boundary delineation, it seems incapable of exercising any form of 
control over when and where livestock graze, which creates considerable pressure on 
key resource areas at different times of the year.  In particular, a relatively large dam 
constructed during the early 1980s on one of Roxeni’s camps draws in considerable 
numbers of cattle from the surrounding villages, especially during the dry season.   
 
In comparison to Roxeni, Lushington and Allanwater have relatively brief histories of 
engagement with rangeland management.  Institutional control at both villages has gone 
through two distinct phases.  Initially, Lushington was incorporated into the AmaGwali 
Tribal Authority and a headman was appointed at the village.  His role was both as 
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intermediary for the articulation of the needs of the village to the tribal authority and in 
the settling of local disputes relating to matters such as stock theft.  Although most of 
the fencing was still in place when the commercial farms were inherited by the early 
inhabitants, there seems to have been little central enforcement of rotational resting or 
grazing of the rangeland, even under the homeland dispensation.  Rather, livestock 
were allowed to graze on a free-ranging basis over all camps simultaneously.  With the 
overthrow of Sebe in 1990 the headman structure was abandoned and, as at Roxeni, 
what remained of the fencing was destroyed during the subsequent period of civil 
unrest.  Thus, the current resource management situation involves no fencing at all, 
apart from in those boundary areas adjoining either government ranches or the 
remaining commercial farms in the area.   
 
Although starting from similar beginnings the early history of grazing management at 
Allanwater was very different.  After initial incorporation into the Thembu Tribal 
Authority, a headman, his associated committee and a ranger were appointed from 
within the village.  However, in contrast to the laissez-faire approach at Lushington it 
appears that a system of rotational grazing was retained.  Moreover, it appears that 
grazing management decisions were still community-driven.  The community would, for 
example, decide which camp(s) were to be rested during the coming year.  The 
headman’s role in this seems to have been largely administrative, as he would be 
required to fill in the necessary paperwork to inform the local magistrate of this decision.   
 
The second phase of institutional development involved the formation of democratically 
elected Resident’s Associations (RA) at both villages, following the civil unrest of the 
early 1990s.  At Lushington this structure currently consists of a separate committee at 
each of the four settlements, which feed into an overarching ‘umbrella’ RA.  These 
committees have an important function in the allocation of land at each settlement, 
particularly to new arrivals from outside the village.  The main function of the RA seems 
to be as a point of contact with external institutions such as NGOs and the local 
Department of Agriculture rather than any form of resource management.  At Allanwater 
the RA alone is responsible for both of these functions.  However, the key point of 
institutional departure between the two settlements is the presence of an additional civic 
structure at Allanwater, Vukani Farmer’s Association (VFA), charged with livestock 
management.  This is analogous to the CPA at Roxeni and consists of all members of 
the village fronted by a committee of 6 elected members and requires the payment of an 
annual membership fee.  This covers costs such as the purchase of chemicals used in 
the communal dipping of village animals and the repair of community fencing.  The 
management committee of VFA decides which camps are grazed and at what stage of 
the year.  It is also able to punish deviant behaviour through the imposition of fines.  
Importantly, this gives an implicit sense that, in addition to receiving other communal 
benefits, livestock owners at Allanwater are collectively managing their grazing 
resource.   
 
These differences in institutional arrangements are reflected in the levels of grazing 
management in operation at each settlement.  At Lushington a ‘free for all’ grazing 
scenario now effectively prevails, with grazing taking place on an entirely ad hoc basis, 
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possibly involving animals from neighbouring villages.  There are no formalised rules to 
control when and where livestock graze, and indistinct community boundaries in certain 
areas.  The only enforcement is that practiced by white farmers on adjoining commercial 
grazing areas, who will impound trespassing communal stock and force the owner to 
pay a considerable fine to retrieve them.  In contrast, grazing at Allanwater has 
consistently been under some form of community management.  The current 
management system involves the complete resting of at least two of the camps each 
year and grazing of the remainder.  However, resting is not undertaken on a pre-
determined, rotational basis but rather is dictated by the perceived condition (heavily 
grazed or not) of a given camp.  An important factor in this is the presence of wire grass 
(Elionurus muticus) as those camps with greater proportions tend to be rested more 
often.  Furthermore, grazing of the open camps is not continuous and seems to be 
driven largely by season and availability of water as well as proximity to the residential 
area of the village.  The camps on the eastern side of the village are grazed during the 
growing season, as access to permanent water is problematic here and the animals 
have to rely on temporary ponds resulting from rainfall.  During the subsequent dry 
season the eastern camps are closed and animals graze the camps on the western 
side, as more permanent water points are available here.  The perceived need to graze 
smallstock in relative proximity to the residential area also means that most of the 
camps surrounding the homesteads are grazed by sheep on a continuous basis.  Thus, 
the grazing system currently in operation appears to be based on a combination of 
indigenous knowledge and flexibility in response to practical constraints. 
 
Management of arable grazing       
Unlike grazing of the formal rangeland camps, control over which differs markedly 
between the villages, grazing of the arable lands as an additional forage reserve for 
livestock is subject to much greater control at all three sites. 
 
At Roxeni this control is facilitated through the use of fencing.  Although, the arable land 
allocation as a whole is fenced off from the formal grazing area only a very small 
number of individual plots have perimeter fencing.  Nevertheless, these are the only 
fields in which crop production is now undertaken, as the threat of livestock damage is a 
major deterrent to cropping outside fenced fields.  Fencing of individual plots has also 
provided greater autonomy to a limited number of owners in the use of these areas for 
the grazing of their livestock.  Crop residues in these plots may be grazed on an 
individual or communal basis depending on the owner of the field.  Several owners also 
co-operate in the use of their fields for sheep production.  Rams are taken from a 
breeding camp and mated with ewes within closed fields.  The pregnant ewes are then 
maintained on the fields to try and ensure an adequate level of forage during the dry 
season.  One individual has also recently grown oats for the benefit of his sheep.  Other 
people even retain rights over the grass available in their plots and use it exclusively for 
their own stock.   
 
Fencing is also used to control the grazing of arable land at Lushington.  Most of this 
has been retained from the original commercial farmers and many people now have 
access to individually fenced arable plots, which they maintain themselves.  These 
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people are able to retain exclusive grazing rights over these areas as dry season forage 
reserves for their livestock.  If a summer crop has been grown the residues will be 
reserved for their cattle and grazed in the field.  This is strictly enforced and any other 
livestock that gain access to this resource will be driven away or even impounded by the 
field owner.  In unfenced areas, maintenance of individual rights over crop residues is 
only possible if they are cut and carried to the homestead for grazing.  This seems to be 
the norm, as very few individuals leave crop residues to be grazed in situ.   
 
As at Lushington, crop production at Allanwater has been perpetuated in the areas 
demarcated as arable during commercial farming but with considerable sub-division of 
plots.  Although the arable blocks retain their perimeter fencing no individual plots are 
fenced.  Nevertheless, a large proportion of these plots continue to be cultivated each 
season and the residues are used to supplement available livestock grazing.  However, 
these are not grazed in situ but rather are cut and carried to the homestead for livestock 
consumption as at Lushington.  The only in situ grazing that takes place on the arable 
lands involves dry season forage crops.  Several individuals continue to cultivate oats 
and barley for livestock consumption at this time, often inter-cropping them between 
maize.  These are grown primarily for winter lambs and ewes in milk although animals 
must be closely watched to ensure that they only graze the forage crop that has been 
cultivated by the owner.  Thus, there is a strong desire to preserve individual grazing 
rights over both maize residues and forage crops.   
 
 
Perceptions of change and rangeland quality  
At Roxeni, livestock owners perceived the historical changes that had occurred within 
the management system in a variety of different ways.  Whilst some regretted the loss 
of the fenced camps due to the flexibility it gave in livestock management most where 
happy that the fenced rangeland perimeter was now gone as it no longer formalised the 
limited ‘betterment’ grazing lands and allowed cattle to range over a far wider area than 
was previously possible.  However, there was a feeling amongst some owners that the 
absence of fixed boundaries combined with the presence of the permanent dam had led 
to increased pressure on local rangeland resources during critical periods such as the 
dry season.  The overall quality of grazing resources within the village was perceived as 
quite low, with few species of good quality being identified during key informant walks.  
Instead areas dominated by Acacia karroo bush, or which had been invaded by 
substantial amounts of karroid shrub, were highlighted.  Much of the remaining grass 
component is dominated by poor quality perennial species such as Aristida congesta 
and Cynodon dactylon.  Soil erosion is also heavy and is a well recognised problem in 
the area (Weaver 1983).  The poor quality of the range and extensive soil erosion is 
corroborated by a local soil conservation report, which determined the local stocking 
rate at just 18 ha/AU, which is very low for the veld type (DALA 1997).   
 
Like Roxeni, the rangeland resource at Lushington is generally of poor quality.  In areas 
of lower elevation, the grass sward tends to have greater cover but is dominated largely 
by unpalatable species such as Elionorus muticus.  At higher elevations the grass 
sward is patchy and consists largely of heavily grazed tufts of Themeda triandra 
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supplemented by less palatable perennials such as Cynodon dactylon and Sporobolus 
africanus and annuals such as Eragrostis capensis.  There is also considerable 
intrusion by small unpalatable shrubs such as Felicia filifolia.  There was a strong 
feeling amongst several of the older men from the village that fencing of the rangeland 
is necessary to allow them to manage it more effectively as a grazing resource and to 
try and rehabilitate areas that had become unproductive.  This is somewhat ironic given 
that the community was unable to maintain the fencing it inherited from the commercial 
farmers.  However, the issue of fencing is very political.  It was suggested that the 
destruction of the original fencing was, at least partly, a deliberate attempt to make a 
break with an oppressive past during a turbulent period of unrest in the early 1990s.  At 
the time the research was undertaken, there was a proposal from the local Department 
of Agriculture to re-fence a substantial proportion of the rangeland perimeter at the 
village.  This was a highly sensitive issue, which was strongly contested by some 
sectors of the community.     
 
In contrast to the other two villages, the grazing resource at Allanwater is in relatively 
good condition.  At a subjective level this was underlined by the perceptions of the local 
people themselves, 89% of whom believed their grazing resources to be in good or very 
good condition, when questioned as part of a previous study (King 2002).  More 
objectively, it is also reflected in the relatively high productivity of stock at Allanwater.  
For example, mean wool clip during 2001 was 3.9 kg per sheep (King 2002).  This 
compares favourably with 2.3 kg per sheep in the degraded communal area of Herschel 
and is close to commercial yields within the Eastern Cape, which historically averaged 
around 4.5 kg per sheep (EDA 1994 in Vetter 2003). 
 
 
DISCUSSION  
 
Struggles over CPR management in the central Eastern Cape region 
These case studies have not only illustrated the extent to which CPRs are being 
practiced in central Eastern Cape Province but have also highlighted several key axes 
of struggle in their operation, as outlined below.  
 
Institutions 
The lack of effective institutions charged with overseeing rangeland management has 
repeatedly been highlighted as one of the main limitations to current CPR management 
in the region (e.g. Ainslie 1999, Cocks et al 2001).  In this study, the critical nature of 
these structures in resource management is underlined by the community of Allanwater, 
which has successfully separated agricultural management (dealt with by VFA) from 
broader community issues (dealt with by the RA).  VFA, whilst ostensibly still ‘nested’ 
within the broader framework of the RA, has the autonomy to deal specifically with 
agricultural issues and thus to act independently and flexibly in the management of the 
grazing resource.  Ostrom (1990) has emphasised the value of nesting institutions 
within broader structures to facilitate effective management.  Thus, the autonomy of 
VFA obviates the need to involve the RA in day to day management decisions, leaving it 
free to focus on higher level issues associated with land allocation and engagement 
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with outside agencies.  The democratic legitimacy of VFA also limits the possibility of ad 
hoc, unelected ‘committees’ associated with grazing management existing in parallel 
with RA structures, as occurred in several post apartheid communities in the former 
Ciskei (Ainslie 1998, Bennett and Barrett 2007).  Indeed, in the absence of strong 
institutions specifically charged with resource management grazing tends to be 
uncoordinated and individually driven.  This is illustrated not only by the situation in 
Lushington, but also in numerous other settlements in the region such as the village of 
Guquka, where an ineffectual RA was supplanted by an ad hoc grazing committee, 
which served only the interests of a landed minority (Bennett and Barrett 2007).  
Although Lushington has committees within each settlement, charged with land 
allocation, they seem to play no role in managing the grazing resource which, in any 
case, should ideally rest with a structure that is representative of all four settlements.  
Indeed, the fundamental constraint to the introduction of such a structure appears to be 
the fragmented nature of the ‘village’ itself.  This underlines the continuing legacy of 
apartheid’s social restructuring policies in constraining current community cohesion and 
development in the former homeland areas.   
 
Political division  
A key aspect of the institutional weakness apparent at Lushington seems to be the 
politically divided nature of the village.  The settlements of Eluk and Khayelitsha have a 
common origin in their foundation by local ex-farm workers.  In contrast, the inhabitants 
of Elundini, as refugees from a neighbouring district, have no historical connection with 
the area and the settlement has a strong, separate identity of its own.  The new 
‘squatter’ settlement of Ekuphumleni has little political identity and appears to still be 
viewed with resentment by the other, more established settlements.  These institutional 
weaknesses may also be exacerbated by the apparent ‘open door’ policy to new arrivals 
being adopted at Eluk and Khayelitsha.  A considerable level of immigration, particularly 
from the Herschel and Glen Grey areas, continues to be sanctioned by the committees 
of each settlement, seemingly on the basis of ethnic and familial ties.  Such political and 
ethnic division, as a consequence of apartheid planning, is apparent throughout the 
former Ciskei.  For example, in the Tyefu area of Peddie, Ainslie (1999) has shown how 
the political and ethnic divisions created by apartheid have contributed to institutional 
dissonance in the control and management of natural resources.  Apartheid planning 
has also created political divisions over resource management in other parts of South 
Africa, particularly between landed (politically powerful) and landless groups (e.g. 
Wotshela 2001, Lebert and Rohde 2007).      
 
In contrast, the strong institutional structure present at Allanwater, is supported by an 
environment of relative political unity.  Most of the inhabitants of the village have a 
common origin and, apart from a brief influx of outsiders during the early 1980s, the 
settlement has expanded largely through natural increase (Wotshela 2001).  Under 
these circumstances people appear to have political cohesion and a willingness and 
ability to cooperate for a perceived common good.    
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Social stratification 
It is widely accepted that the majority of households in the central Eastern Cape now 
depend on cash income from jobs (either earned by resident householders or sent back 
as remittances) and state transfers (mainly pensions) for their livelihoods, and income 
generated within villages, particularly from agriculture forms only a minor component of 
the average income of most households (Hebinck and Van Averbeke 2007).  Moreover, 
although livestock act as a form of livelihood security (rather than direct cash income) in 
many households, ownership is increasingly concentrated in the hands of a relatively 
small minority (Ainslie et al 2002, Van Averbeke and Bennett 2007).  It is thus difficult to 
characterise settlements in the region as genuinely agrarian in nature as many now 
effectively function as ‘commuter villages’ for local towns and stock ownership is often 
limited.  This process of ‘depeasantisation’, although particularly marked in this region of 
South Africa, is also being experienced in many other parts of Africa (Bryceson 2000 
cited in Peters 2004).   
 
The relationship between socio-economic stratification and level of effective commons 
management is evident in the case villages.  Roxeni forms part of the rural commuter 
belt for the local town of Alice (Figure 1) and livelihoods depend largely and increasingly 
on waged income.  This is reflected not only in the relatively high mean household 
income at the settlement but also by the near absence of crop production and the 
relatively low and declining level of livestock ownership.  Although issues surrounding 
land access and management are of continuing importance at the village, the prevailing 
social structure means that few depend on the land anymore for their livelihood.  This 
may partly explain why, despite the existence of RFA, the village has been unable to 
engage in effective rangeland management.  In contrast, Allanwater demonstrates that 
some settlements in the former Ciskei remain fundamentally agrarian in character and, 
importantly, support effective CPRs for rangeland management.  There is an almost 
ubiquitous engagement with agriculture amongst the inhabitants of Allanwater and a 
significant proportion of households depending on agricultural activities for their 
livelihood (King 2002).  Furthermore, most households at the settlement are very poor 
suggesting limited engagement with waged income (Statistics South Africa 2001).  This 
largely shared sense of social identity appears to have been important in fostering the 
communal ethos necessary for effective CPR management.    
 
Resource definition 
In addition to social differentiation, a more pressing and practical influence on the ability 
to engage in co-ordinated rangeland management at Roxeni is the lack of definition of 
boundaries and the associated problem of an amorphous user group, particularly during 
the dry season.  Under these circumstances, attempts at range management from 
within the village are fruitless when outsiders are not following the same management 
rules.  Both Bromley (1989) and Lawry (1990) have highlighted the inability to enforce 
resource boundaries and thereby control user access as a key constraint to the 
management of common pool resources.  Roxeni’s inability to enforce historical 
rangeland boundaries stems partly from the very high local pressures on limited 
rangeland resources.  This is symptomatic of the planned areas of the former Ciskei, 
where a long history of natural population growth, combined with limited land allocations 
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and forced resettlement policies, has created an environment in which localised 
pressure is high, with the breakdown of mechanisms of land management and 
associated land degradation (Cousins 1996, Ainslie 1998, Cocks et al 2001).  However, 
the lack of boundary definition cannot be considered entirely a result of external forces.  
Rather, there is a feeling that the community, at least in part, chooses not to enforce its 
boundaries to facilitate access to more extensive grazing, particularly the areas lost 
under betterment.   
 
Moreover, this lack of defined rangeland boundaries finds some resonance with more 
recent interpretations of common property theory in its application to African grazing 
systems.  Cousins (2000) emphasises how ‘fuzzy’ boundaries, where territories are not 
divided into discrete land units that only one group has access to, are an inherent 
feature of common property regimes in Africa and facilitate access to key resources at 
different times of the year.  Thus, the current situation at Roxeni might be interpreted in 
this way, with fuzzy boundaries enabling access by all local stock to a greater degree of 
spatial heterogeneity in terms of available forage and to permanent water during the dry 
season at Roxeni dam.  Despite this, it remains difficult to construe the current system 
as a genuine CPR as the ‘fuzziness’ in place seems to have emerged by default and 
there remains a distinct lack of co-ordination between settlements or any form of basic 
rule structure associated with resource access and management.      
 
Availability of grazing 
The lack of adequate grazing resources at Roxeni contrasts sharply with Lushington 
and Allanwater, which have access to considerable areas of communal rangeland.  
Allanwater in particular, seems to have benefited from a relatively small user group and 
a large allocation of land.  Much of this fortune has an historical basis.  The decision to 
occupy Allanwater provided the original squatter families with a definite resource 
advantage over their neighbouring formally settled counterparts (Wotshela 2001).  In 
this respect, Allanwater might effectively be considered as an oasis of relative privilege.  
Such historical privilege, whilst rare, does occur in other parts of the former Ciskei.  
Cocks et al (2001: 5), outline a very similar scenario in which the “….fortuitous land 
expropriation policies of the former (Ciskei) government” has enabled the Masakane 
community (a group of former farm workers and their families) to lay claim to extensive 
grazing land comprising several former commercial stock farms, despite being 
surrounded by overcrowded communities with limited grazing access.  Likewise, the 
village of Koloni in the Middledrift area, benefited from being a former mission station 
and pioneer site for betterment in the region, receiving a large allocation of land and no 
influx of people forcibly removed from ‘black spot’ areas (Ndlovu 1991).  This has been 
fundamental in the perpetuation of a recognisable CPR at the settlement (Bennett and 
Barrett 2007).  This suggests that spatially inadequate grazing resources may be a 
fundamental constraint to the maintenance or development of CPRs within many 
communities, a view corroborated by Ainslie et al. (1998).  At the broader level, the 
importance of spatially adequate grazing in supporting functionally recognisable CPRs 
has been underlined by comprehensive research undertaken in the Namaqualand area 
of South Africa (Allsopp et al. 2007) and in other parts of Africa (e.g. Niamir-Fuller 1998, 
Niamir-Fuller and Turner 1999).           
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Fencing 
Related to this is the importance of fencing in resource control and access.  Although, 
historically, fencing has been fiercely contested and politically contentious, its retention 
seems to be correlated with the perpetuation of basic CPRs in the region.  This is 
evidenced not only by the case of Allanwater but also by the other communities such as 
Koloni, discussed above.  In contrast in the Tyefu area of Peddie, where fencing was 
resisted, an open access grazing regime prevails and rangeland is highly degraded 
(Ainslie 1999).  This suggests that local communities may now be unable to engage in 
effective communal management of grazing resources without fencing.  Persistent state 
intervention in the region through extensive betterment and acquisition of fenced 
commercial farms for communal occupation has encouraged a doctrine of rangeland 
management premised on the need for grazing boundaries to be defined through 
perimeter fencing - a view that still finds active support within the provincial Department 
of Agriculture.  A similar situation prevails in communal areas of Zimbabwe, where 
fencing has been used in government grazing schemes to demarcate community 
grazing land (Scoones 1999).  Whilst, this has enabled CPRs to be maintained in 
instances where grazing resources are adequate, a lack of attention to patterns of 
resource heterogeneity in the demarcation of the paddocks has led to animals being 
grazed outside the fenced boundaries when resources become limited e.g. during the 
dry season (Scoones 1999).  This is indicative of what might happen if fencing was re-
instated at communities such as Roxeni.  Despite the apparent irony in communities 
such as Lushington and Roxeni, which destroyed their fences as political statements, 
expressing a desire for their reinstatement to facilitate boundary definition, this 
underlines not only the endemic ‘fencing complex’ in the region but also the lack of 
effective institutions capable of cooperative resource management across neighbouring 
settlements.  This is in marked contrast to the situation in many other parts of Africa 
where ‘fuzzy’ boundaries are the norm and institutions controlling the flexibility in 
resource access this necessitates are highly developed (Cousins 2000).    
 
Private grazing of arable lands 
The empirical findings from all three villages suggest that grazing of available arable 
forage during the dry season is controlled almost exclusively on an individual basis, 
irrespective of the extent of communal management being exercised over rangeland 
grazing.  Importantly, the retention of individual rights over arable forage does not 
appear to be related to de jure security of tenure, as suggested by Bennett and Barrett 
(2007), as private rights over crop residues and forage are exercised at both Allanwater 
and Lushington where there is no formal title to land.  Nor is secure fencing around 
individual plots a pre-requisite for retention of individual rights over forage.  At 
Allanwater and Lushington, rights over crop residues in unfenced fields are exercised 
through cut and carry.  Furthermore, rights to cultivated dry season forage, which is 
grazed in situ, are also retained at Allanwater by the vigilance of individual owners, 
despite the complete absence of fencing around individual arable allocations.  However, 
in situ communal grazing of forage does seem to occur at all the settlements on a 
default basis, for example, where individuals have grown a summer maize crop in an 
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unfenced plot and not harvested the residues.  Under these circumstances there seems 
to be an implicit acceptance that owners have forfeited their individual rights.   
 
This strong distinction of property rights between arable plots and rangeland is 
corroborated by studies from other parts of Africa.  Scoones (1999), for example, has 
documented how private tenure rights can be retained over crop residues and grass 
through harvesting or use of fencing.  In a more extreme case of commoditization, 
Southgate and Hulme (2000) outline how, in some parts of Kenya, crop residues are 
rented out to pastoralists by individual producers during the dry season.  
 
Typology 
Thus, varying degrees of common property control over rangeland grazing are in place 
in communal areas of central Eastern Cape Province ranging from the complete open 
access scenario, through ‘minimum’ common property, to isolated cases involving 
maintenance of a genuine CPR, where appropriate historical and socio-economic 
conditions prevail.  However, there appears to be no evidence of CPR management of 
the arable lands for dry season grazing.  Rather, all control over arable grazing seems 
to be exercised at an individual or at best small group level even when pressure on local 
grazing resources is relatively low.  On the basis of these findings, a typology of the 
grazing management systems operating in central Eastern Cape and their key 
determinants has been developed (Figure 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: General typology of grazing management systems in operation in 
central Eastern Cape Province and their key determinants. 
Rangeland grazing 
undertaken on ‘open 
access’ basis 
 
Grazing of arable 
land controlled on 
individual basis by 
those with access  
 
Rangeland grazing 
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basis as part of a recognised 
common property regime 
 
Ineffective communal 
control over management 
of grazing resources 
 
Effective communal 
control over 
management of grazing 
 
 
Pressure on local 
grazing resources 
Efficacy of local grazing 
management institutions 
 
INTERACTION 
Low grazing pressure 
and strong institutions 
High grazing pressure 
and either weak or 
strong institutions 
Low grazing pressure 
and weak institutions 
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This typology suggests that there are two major determinants of grazing management 
systems in the central Eastern Cape region.  The first is the degree of pressure on local 
grazing resources and will be heavily influenced by factors such as the size of the 
grazing resource, its natural ecology, the number of livestock owners and size of the 
local population.  The other is the degree of development of local institutions for natural 
resource management, which is determined by such factors as local politics and 
ethnicity and social stratification.  These two sets of factors interact to produce four 
possible scenarios: low grazing pressure with either strong or weak institutions and high 
grazing pressure with either strong or weak institutions.  However, only with a (rare) 
combination of both low grazing pressure and strong institutional structures does it 
seem possible for a CPR for rangeland management to exist in the region.  The other 
three (more widespread) scenarios result in grazing being undertaken on an effectively 
open access basis.  Regardless of how effective communal control over rangeland 
grazing is, grazing of arable land occurs almost exclusively on a private property basis. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
It is clear that in the communal grazing lands of central Eastern Cape Province, ongoing 
struggles are occurring in most areas, both within and between communities, over the 
management of common property grazing resources.  Current struggles over common 
property grazing are occurring along a number of axes, which are often interlinked.  
Indeed, some appear to be almost ubiquitous and thus critical to the effective 
functioning of common property management systems in the region.  Importantly, these 
provide an insight into the types of interventions that may help to develop and 
strengthen common property regimes which are suited to local grazing systems.  Just 
as Cousins (2000) has argued for a broader interpretation of the ‘new institutionalism’ in 
an African context, the application of common property theory in South Africa, 
particularly in the central Eastern Cape region, requires further development.  The 
region carries a political history, which is largely unique, even within colonial Africa, and 
it is vital that interventions give adequate recognition to the considerable social 
heterogeneity that this has created and that these are undertaken on a case by case 
basis.   
 
A critical aspect of this will be the creation of effective institutions for the management of 
rangeland grazing.  One aspect of this will be the development of institutions 
responsible for cooperative governance of local rangeland resources, as emphasised by 
Ainslie (1999).  This is paramount, as one of the fundamental constraints to the 
functioning of CPRs in the region is the limited, and now effectively inadequate, grazing 
resources many communities have legitimate access to (Ainslie et al. 1998).  Whilst 
land redistribution does offer a possible solution for communities in proximity to 
commercial farms or plantations, most will have to continue to make do with the little 
they already have and simply make more effective use of it.  Thus, a key part of this will 
be the creation of local institutions, which have a resource management remit that 
extends beyond existing, often arbitrary (ecologically and socially), community 
 20 
boundaries and facilitate more extensive grazing.  Importantly, this will also require the 
development of tenable and enforceable resource management rules to avoid simply 
legitimising existing open-access scenarios.  One approach to this might be to ‘nest’ 
institutions of cooperative resource management within higher level local governance 
structures, which have broader administrative functions (Lawry 1990).  Where co-
management is required between several neighbouring villages, as at Roxeni, the local 
municipal ward committee might be the appropriate place to embed this.  However, this 
concept might also be extended to communities consisting of separate settlements, 
such as Lushington, where management within the community is paramount.  Under 
these circumstances the community’s own umbrella RA structure, might be an 
appropriate entity in which to nest such an institution. 
 
The formation of such cross-community, cooperative management institutions and their 
political legitimacy will depend largely on changes to existing legislation.  The 
Communal Property Associations (CPA) Act (1996), gives communities legal rights in 
holding and managing property in terms of a written constitution (Republic of South 
Africa 1996, Cocks et al. 2001), and the more recent Communal Land Rights Act 
(CLRA) (Republic of South Africa 2004), has also persisted with an approach of vesting 
land ownership and management rights within discrete and well-defined communities 
(Republic of South Africa 2004).  Although these approaches can prove relatively 
effective where resources are well defined and pressure is relatively low (e.g. VFA at 
Allanwater), the Roxeni (RFA) case demonstrates their inefficacy when historical village 
boundaries are no longer enforceable in the face of heavy local grazing pressure.  
Rather, a legislative approach is required, which has greater flexibility in its application 
according local needs.  Specifically it must be used to cater more effectively for those 
communities with limited land access, by formalising statutory and enforceable 
rangeland access and grazing management rights (where agreed) across existing 
historical boundaries.  A vital aspect of this will be the provision of government support 
in helping communities to develop effective institutions charged exclusively with 
cooperative resource management and embedding these structures at the appropriate 
level of local governance (Cocks et al. 2001).  There will also need to be ongoing 
support from local Agricultural Departments in the development of appropriate grazing 
management regimes, which make best use of available ecological heterogeneity both 
in time and space.  Provision of permanent water points will be a critical part of this at 
many sites. 
 
Importantly, in areas such as central Eastern Cape, achieving this will require not only 
national legislative hurdles to be overcome but also locally entrenched philosophies of 
management through fencing.  Whilst fencing may be appropriate in some applications 
(e.g. in managing key resource areas such as arable land allocations), in most cases 
effective resource management will only be possible through neighbouring settlements 
engaging with one another to develop co-operative management frameworks based on 
shared rules rather than separation by physical boundaries.  Furthermore, it is vital that 
any approach to communal rangeland management acknowledges the considerable 
social stratification that now exists in the region.  The diminished dependence on land-
based activities for the rural majority means that natural resource management, whilst 
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still of clear importance in some areas and amongst some sections of communities, is 
no longer as vital to local livelihoods as it once was.  This suggests that local needs 
must be prioritised on a case by case basis and that any efforts at developing natural 
resource management capability must also be complemented by the provision of basic 
services and infrastructure to those whose livelihoods are now firmly tied to an 
increasingly de-agrarianised economy.  
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